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ABSTRACT 
 What demographic backgrounds are associated with a person’s attitudes toward 
immigrants and immigration policies? Applying group threat theory and contact theory, I 
propose that race, age, education, political views, and religiosity all affect how people view 
immigration. To test the hypotheses, I analyze data from the 2014 General Social Survey, in 
which adults living in households in the United States are randomly selected and interviewed. A 
subset containing 1,022 respondents who answered every question relevant to this study is 
selected from the 2014 GSS. The univariate analysis shows that most Americans do not agree 
with the statement that immigrants undermine American culture, and that Americans are divided 
on whether the number of immigrants should be increased nowadays. The multivariate result 
indicates that education and political views are the most significant predictors of how one views 
immigrants and immigration policies, correspondingly, while race, age, and religiosity have no 
statistically significant relationships with either dependent variable. Statistical findings support 
the hypothesis that the more liberal a person is, the more likely the person is to agree that 
immigrants do not undermine American culture and to say that the number of immigrants 
nowadays should be increased. Contact theory is consistent with the result of this study. 
However, the findings also demonstrate that immigration is a complicated issue. This study is 
valuable in understanding the acceptance of immigrants across demographic groups. It also 
invites additional research on this important topic that will affect the future of the United States.  
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 As a country of immigrants, the United States has a longstanding history of having one of 
the largest numbers of foreign-born citizens in the world (Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker 2012). 
Historically, increased immigration has been strongly correlated with the growth of the economy 
and social development(Fussell 2014). However, Americans’ stances on immigrants and 
immigration policies have not always been positive (Fussell 2014; Berg 2014; Berg 2015). 
Notably, in recent years, there has been growing anti-immigrant sentiments along with the social 
and political change in this nation (Flores 2018).  
 Scholars of many disciplines have been studying the intricate relationship between the 
benefits of immigration to the nation and anti-immigration views (Bikmen 2015; Chandler and 
Tsai 2001; Czaika 2015; Esses, Brochu, and Dickson 2012; Esses 2002). Sociologists, 
specifically, have been theorizing such correlation (Berg 2015; Fussell 2014). Of the sociological 
theories proposed for the attitudes towards immigration, group threat theory is cited frequently to 
describe the issue at hand. Group threat theory describes the perceived fear of the presence and 
size of the out-group among in-group members (Berg 2014; Blumer 1958; Brown 2013). On the 
immigration issue in the United States, the in-group usually includes native-born Americans, 
while the out-group covers foreigners as well as naturalized citizens residing in the United 
States. Based on the group threat theory, native-born Americans may feel that the size of 
immigrants threatens job and welfare prospective for the natives (Czaika 2015). Especially, for 
many White Americans, the vast number of immigrants from Hispanic and Asian nations may 
soon change the racial makeup of the nation, as there will likely be less than half of Americans 
who identify as White in the next decade or so (Berg 2014; Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, and Lahav 
2015). The “threat” of immigration is perceived differently across demographic groups in the 
United States (Cabaniss and Cameron 2018; Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Nagel and Ehrkamp 
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2017; Chandler and Tsai 2001). Moreover, there are approximately 50 million legal and 
unauthorized immigrants, which is around a sixth of the entire country’s population (Hoefer, 
Rytina, and Baker 2012). Therefore, it is vital and reasonable to examine how various 
demographic identities correlate the stances on immigration. 
 In this research, I propose that demographic classifications such as race, age, education, 
political leanings, and religiosity have impacts on the in-group individuals’ attitudes towards 
immigrants. Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
1. Compared to White people, people of color are more likely to agree that immigrants do 
not undermine American culture and to say that the number of immigrants nowadays 
should be increased. 
2. The older a person is, the less likely the person is to agree that immigrants do not 
undermine American culture and to say that the number of immigrants nowadays should 
be increased. 
3. The more years of education one completes, the more likely the person is to agree that 
immigrants do not undermine American culture and to say that the number of immigrants 
nowadays should be increased. 
4. The more liberal a person is, the more likely he or she agrees that immigrants do not 
undermine American culture and says that the number of immigrants nowadays should be 
increased 
5. The more frequently one attends religious services, the less likely the person is to agree 
that immigrants do not undermine American culture and to say that the number of 
immigrants nowadays should be increased. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
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Group Threat Theory 
 Proposed by Blumer (1958:3), group threat theory describes how race prejudice 
originates from group positions rather than individual feelings. Before Blumer, social scientists 
mainly thought that racial bias is expressed in the form of individual feeling. However, Blumer 
(1958:3) shows that the precedent views lack the understanding of racial relations in terms of 
racial groups. Race, in the United States, is institutionalized. It means that individuals who are 
racially prejudiced discriminate on the basis of the social identification of self and others. 
Therefore, as Blumer (1958:7) claims, it is inadequate to evaluate individual feelings alone to 
grasp prejudice. Instead, group positioning is crucial to the comprehension of the prerogative 
feelings of the “others.” Threat, the feeling that the inferior group may jeopardize the superior 
group’s social position, is then established on the ground of collective negative feelings.  
 Going beyond race, the study by Ben-Nun Bloom’s team examines two areas of threats 
native-born people feel about incoming migrants (Ben-Nun Bloom et al. 2015). The first is 
cultural threat. Cultural threat describes the fear of losing cultural capitals such as ethnic history, 
norms, values and symbolic establishments to diversity due to immigration (Ben-Nun Bloom et 
al. 2015:1762). Cultural threat makes in-group members cohere closely to their group values, and 
a critical part of such group values is often the negative attitudes toward immigrants, since 
immigrants threaten symbolic social and political power of the natives. In the Western countries, 
immigrants of color face the most scrutiny while integrating into the communities they are 
moving into, as race is a distinct indicator of a social and cultural identity. The second form of 
threat is material threat (Ben-Nun Bloom et al. 2015:1762). The sense of material threat comes 
from the identification of the loss of resources such as jobs, welfares, and housing because of 
newcomers. The negative feelings toward immigrants increase when a native-born person sees 
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that there are out-group members holding jobs that were used to be held by in-group members, or 
when a native finds out that the price of owning a house rises as there is a lack of supply of 
available housing more so than ever. Cultural and material threats may be targeted at different 
groups of people. For instance, natives who feel culturally threatened dislike immigrants that are 
vastly different from them. On the other hand, individuals who are materially threatened may 
only support unintegrated immigrants because unintegrated immigrants will have a harder time 
taking jobs from the natives. Ben-Nun Bloom et al. (2015:1763) argue that while the two forms 
of threat appeal to different psychological motivations, they complement each other in 
constructing the opposition to immigration. By taking race and religion into account, the study 
shows that many immigrants are presented as threatening in both ways (Ben-Nun Bloom et al. 
2015). Moreover, since each of the two types of threat can also trigger the rationalization of 
xenophobia, the overall hostile attitudes toward immigrants will likely to increase when either 
cultural or material threat exists among the in-group members. 
Contact Theory  
 Contact theory, often referred to as contact hypothesis, helps explain the reasons behind a 
person’s pro- or anti-immigration sentiments in a different way. Initially proposed by Allport 
(1954), contact theory states that the lack of interpersonal and intergroup contact may be closely 
related to widespread prejudices and stereotyping on minorities. Contrary to the group threat 
theory that conceptualizes xenophobia as the result of conflict and fear, contact theory considers 
prejudice as the result of a form of socialization that fails to expose the individual to the diverse 
society he or she lives in (Allport 1954; Fussell 2014). Contact theory also proposes that with 
future positive encounters, individuals’ belief system and attitudes towards a diverse population 
can be reshaped. In this study, contact theory can also explain how race, age, education, political 
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leaning, and religiosity may affect one’s position on immigration. Education level, for instance, 
positively correlates one’s contact with out-group members, as the school is a place to gather 
people of varied background and personal values. Specifically, colleges provide a platform for 
students to learn in a community that is often different in demographic composition from where 
students are from. In compliance with the contact theory, the hypothesis that people with more 
years of education hold more positive attitudes toward immigration is logical. Similarly, people 
of particular racial background, age, political affiliation, and religion also have more contacts 
with their corresponding out-groups than others. Consequently, the contact theory provides 
valuable insights and sociological background for this study, especially on the causes and effects 
of prejudices. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Sociological literature on the issue of immigration has focused extensively on 
immigrants’ assimilation and social inequalities that exist in the current immigration system 
(Cabaniss and Cameron 2018; Berg 2014; Bohman and Hjerm 2014). Studies emphasizing the 
relationship between demographic factors and immigration attitudes primarily concentrate on 
one specific social identity, such as race, political affiliation, or religion (Browne, Reingold, and 
Kronberg 2018; Knoll 2009; Bohman and Hjerm 2016; Flores 2018; Hawley 2011). While there 
is currently a lack of comprehensive analyses of various demographic aspects on the attitudes 
toward immigrants, previous literature provides invaluable resources concerning the rationales 
behind the support for immigration among Americans. 
Racial Effect 
 This research seeks to establish what demographic factors affect one’s opinions on 
immigrants and immigration policies. Previous literature recognizes that one’s race has a 
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significant effect on how the person views immigration (Berg 2014; Bloom et al. 2015; Fussell 
2014; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Focusing on the experience of White people in this country, 
Berg (2014) shows that White Americans who are exposed to mixed-race or mixed-ethnicity 
individuals are more likely to hold immigrant-friendly positions than Whites who live in 
homogeneous communities. The researcher explains this phenomenon by applying the contact 
theory. Contact theory maintains that the lack of exposure between groups of people can lead to 
stereotyping and bias against certain out-group individuals. In this case, White Americans who 
live in multi-racial neighborhoods are better able to understand the struggles of immigrants and 
people of color because they are forced to interact with those who are not White Americans in 
the neighborhood. Thus, it is more likely for those White people to hold sympathetic views on 
immigrants and immigration policy.  
 Looking at the experience of people of color, Browne, Reingold, and Kronberg (2018) 
further hypothesize that African Americans are more open to immigration reforms than White 
Americans. Their research concludes that while the majority of African American legislators 
voted for restrictive immigration legislation between 2005 and 2012, it was at a consistently 
lower rate than their counterparts. The researchers controlled political party as a variable and 
found out that while Black Democrats were similar to White Democrats on many political issues, 
on race relations and civil rights, African American politicians are consistently more liberal. As 
immigration issues are an extension of race relations, the study shows that one’s race may affect 
how one sees immigrants nowadays.  
 Furthermore, Bobo and Hutchings (1996) synthesize previous research and theorize that 
the perception of competition can be driven by one’s racial identification and racial alienation. 
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By conducting interviews, Bobo and Hutchings extend Blumer’s group threat framework and 
imply that there is an underlying correlation between race and immigration attitudes. 
Religious Effect 
 In addition to race, various studies also suggest that a person’s religion may influence his 
or her attitudes towards immigration. Many scholars hypothesize that higher religiosity may 
mean low immigration tolerance (Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Knoll 2009). Through a cross-
country analysis, Bohman and Hjerm (2014) look into the implications of religious belief and 
practices. The authors theorize that religious in-group attachment stimulates greater aversion to 
people who do not practice the same religion. Although immigrants come from various religious 
backgrounds, the difference in national origins often results in differences in denominations and 
religions. Drawing on group threat theory and social identity theory, sociologists point out that 
religious fundamentalists, who practice more often than non-fundamentalists, may be particularly 
against mass immigration, since they have the strongest attachment to each other, resulting in 
considerable aversion to those of other religious identities (Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Knoll 
2009).  
 Moreover, Nagel and Ehrkamp’s (2017) analysis of the relationship between Christian 
faith and multiculturalism reaches a similar conclusion about religiosity’s effect on immigration 
attitudes. The two scholars visited a few dozen church sites in North Carolina, South Carolina, 
and Georgia, and interviewed pastors and church-goers. They find that while some congregations 
of the Christian faith have very welcoming attitudes toward immigrants, the result is racially and 
culturally based. In other words, congregations with high immigrant church-goers are likely to be 
the ones with liberal views on immigration. However, there is also clear segregation between 
immigrant/non-White majority churches and White/non-immigrant majority churches. Within 
DEMOGRAPHICS AND IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES 
 
 10 
the Christian faith, and among those who regularly practice, there is still a lack of understanding 
and tolerance towards people outside the religion. Consistent with contact theory, Nagel and 
Ehrkamp’s findings show that homogeneity in religion also leads to racialized bias against 
immigrants, particularly immigrants of color. 
Political Effect 
 Furthermore, sociological studies imply that politics and political leanings affect the 
attitude toward immigrants (Bohman and Hjerm 2016; Flores 2018; Hawley 2011; Wilkes et al. 
2007). Flores’ research on the 2016 U.S. presidential election suggests that Trump’s campaign 
speeches mobilized a new wave of anti-immigration sentiments (Flores 2018). By conducting a 
survey experiment in which respondents are asked about immigration issues after being exposed 
to pro- and anti-immigration messages, Flores (2018) demonstrates that politicians’ messages 
have attitudinal effects on their audience.  
 Comparatively, research by Wilkes et al. (2007) reveals that support for right-wing 
parties correlates anti-foreigner sentiments in Europe. Since people of different political leanings 
adhere to messages from politicians of their specific political affiliation, it is reasonable to 
hypothesize that political leaning correlates immigration attitudes. By examining the relationship 
between the existence of radical political parties and anti-immigration attitudes, Bohman and 
Hjerm (2016) further confirm the result from previous literature that political leaning is a crucial 
part of people’s positions on immigration. Their finding demonstrates that the presence and 
representational strength of radical right parties in national parliaments in Europe moderately 
correlate anti-immigration views with statistic significance (Bohman and Hjerm 2016). This 
correlation is also explainable by group threat theory and contact theory. The platform of many 
conservative parties is based on the fear and lack of understanding of a certain out-group. 
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Research studies on the effects of political affiliations in regard to immigration attitudes offer 
crucial rationalization of the hypothesis that liberal-leaning individuals hold relatively more 
positive views on immigration than conservative-leaning people (Bohman and Hjerm 2016; 
Hawley 2011; Wilkes et al. 2007). 
Educational Effect 
 Just as importantly, social scientists also point out the influence of educational attainment 
as a factor on the attitudes towards immigration (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Lancee and Sarrasin 
2015). In theory, Lancee and Sarrasin (2015:490) illustrate that Western educational system 
promotes the egalitarian values and the liberalization of the mind. Under this educational system, 
students learn to think critically and analyze issues through logical reasoning. On the issue of 
immigration, specifically, studies indicate that people with higher education tend to evaluate 
economic prospect when formulating their support or opposition to specific immigration policies 
(Chandler and Tsai 2001; Lancee and Sarrasin 2015). Furthermore, Lancee and Sarrasin’s 
multivariate analysis confirms that higher level of education correlates more positive attitudes 
toward immigrants, though the effect might not have been as large as what preceding studies 
suggested (Lancee and Sarrasin 2015:497; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2004). Studies on the effect 
of educational attainment on people’s immigration standpoints support the hypothesis that the 
more years of education, the more likely one is to agree that immigrants do not undermine 
American culture and to say that immigrant number to the United States should be increased. 
 Given a lack of a comprehensive analysis of demographic effects on attitudes toward 
immigrants, established literature invites further research into how social identities correlate with 
each other in individual’s support for immigration. Additionally, literature provides a theoretical 
and rational foundation for the hypotheses in this study. 
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METHODS 
 This research uses data from the 2014 General Social Survey (GSS) (Smith et al. 2018). 
The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago carries out the GSS 
annually and in recent years biennially. The population of the survey is English or Spanish-
speaking, age 18 or older, non-institutionalized or living in group quarters residents of the United 
States. The GSS sample is drawn through an area probability system that randomly chooses 
respondents in U.S. households, and the response rate for 2014 was about 70 percent. The unit of 
analysis in this study is individuals. In the 2014 survey, there are in total 3,842 respondents. For 
this study, 1,022 people were included because they were in the appropriate ballots and answered 
all the relevant survey questions. The missing data from the survey were removed because they 
only represent a minimal portion of the entire dataset. For further information on how the data 
were collected, visit http://gss.norc.org/.  
 This study uses two dependent variables to test the hypotheses. They are “immigrants do 
not undermine American culture” and “increase immigration.” The concept these variables are 
measuring is the attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies. In the General Social 
Survey, the first question is “how much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
American culture is generally undermined by immigrants.” Respondents are asked to give 
answers as 1 “agree strongly,” 2 “agree,” 3 “neither agree nor disagree,” 4 “disagree,” 5 
“disagree strongly.” The second variable is measured by the GSS question “do you think the 
number of immigrants to America nowadays should be?” Respondents are asked to respond with 
1 as “increased a lot,” 2 as “increased a little,” 3 as “remain the same as it is,” 4 as “reduced a 
little,” and 5 as “reduced a lot.” I recoded the second variable so that higher numbers represent 
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positive attitudes towards immigration. The new values are 1 “decreased a lot,” 2 “decreased a 
little,” 3 “remain the same as it is,” 4 “increased a little,” and 5 “increased a lot.” 
 The independent variables in this study are race, age, education, political views and 
religious services. The independent variable “race” measures the respondent’s racial background 
with the survey question phrased as “What race do you consider yourself” in the GSS, and it 
includes three valid answers: 1 for “White,” 2 for “Black,” and 3 for “Others.” This research 
combines the two categories “Black” and “Others” to “People of Color” to compare the 
responses on immigration from White and non-White people. The category “White People” is 
assigned value 0 in the statistical analysis, and “People of Color” category is given numerical 
value 1. The variable “age” measures the respondent’s age. The survey question is “respondent’s 
age.” It is a scale variable with responses from 18 to 88, and respondents of 89 years old and 
older are collapsed into one category “89.” For this study and the convenience of having an 
interval-ratio level variable, the category “89” is interpreted as 89 years old. The variable 
“education” is measured by the survey question “What is the highest grade of elementary or high 
school the respondent finished? Did the respondent complete one or more years of college?” It is 
a scale variable with possible responses from 0 to 20. Political views in this study are measured 
by the variable “liberalism.” The survey question is “where would you place yourself on the 1-7 
political view scale?” The possible answers are 1 as “extremely liberal,” 2 as “liberal,” 3 as 
“slightly liberal,” 4 as “moderate,” 5 as “slightly conservative,” 6 as “conservative,” and 7 as 
“extremely conservative.” I reverse-coded this variable to reflect how liberal a respondent is. In 
the new variable, 1 represents “extremely conservative”; 2 is “conservative”; 3 is “slightly 
conservative”; 4 is “moderate”; 5 is “slightly liberal”; 6 is “liberal”; 7 is “extremely liberal.” Last 
but not least, the independent variable “religious services” in this study is determined by the GSS 
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variable that measures yearly religious services attendance. The survey question is “how often do 
you attend religious services?” This variable has an ordinal-level answers from 0 to 8, the 
variable separates religious events attendance to 0 “never,” 1 “less than once a year,” 2 “once a 
year,” 3 “ several times a year,” 4 “once a month,” 5 “2-3x a month,” 6 “nearly every week,” 7 
“every week,” and 8 “more than once a week.” To calculate the number of times one attends 
religious services in a year, I recoded this variable. The new values are: 0 for “never,” 0.5 for 
“less than once a year,” 1 for “once a year,” 3 for “ several times a year,” 12 for “once a month,” 
30 for “2-3x a month,” 40 for “nearly every week,” 52 for “every week,” and 100 “more than 
once a week.”  
 The control variable in this study is “sex,” and it is measured by the GSS variable sex. 
The corresponding survey question asks the respondent’s sex. Sex is a nominal variable, and it is 
measured by value 1 for “men” and value 2 for “women.” The variable is recoded into a dummy 
variable which has the men category as 0 and women as 1. 
FINDINGS 
Univariate Findings 
 Table 1 illustrates the means, medians, and standard deviations of the dependent, 
independent, and control variables. The mean for the dependent variable “immigrants do not 
undermine American Culture” is roughly in the middle of 3 and 4, and the median of the variable 
is 4. It means that the average response to the corresponding survey question “immigrants 
undermine American culture” is somewhere between “neither agree nor disagree” and “disagree” 
and the middle point of all responses is “disagree.” Figure 1 demonstrates that nearly half of all 
respondents have “disagree” as their answer to the question of whether immigrants undermine 
American culture. Furthermore, only approximately 19 percent of the respondents have “agree 
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strongly” or “agree” as their answers. It indicates that a vast majority of the population of the 
survey do not adhere to the negative view on immigrants.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 Table 1 also shows that the mean for the second dependent variable “increase 
immigration” lies between 2 and 3. It tells us that the average response to the corresponding 
survey question is between “reduced a little” and “remain the same as it is.” It indicates that 
many Americans do not want the number of immigrants to their country to be increased, which 
also reflects a somewhat negative view on immigration policies. Figure 2 shows that the most 
common answer to the question on the number of immigrants is “remain the same as it is,” with 
around 42 percent of respondents choosing this answer. The result implies that many respondents 
want to maintain the current flow of immigrants coming into the United States. However, Figure 
2 also shows that more than 43 percent of respondents chose “reduced a lot” and “reduced a 
little.” It shows that many respondents are dissatisfied with the number of immigrants coming 
into the United States and would like the number to be decreased. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 Figure 3 shows that White people constitute around three-quarters of the respondents, and 
Black people are roughly 14 percent of the respondents. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 Figure 4 illustrates that the most common age group is between 45 and 59 years old, with 
nearly 30 percent of respondents. The average age of the dataset is approximately 49 years old. 
There are also more respondents under 44 years old (around 42 percent) than over 60 years old 
(around 28 percent). 
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[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 For the education variable, table 1 shows that the mean is around 14, and the standard 
deviation is around 3. It shows that the average American completes some college education or 
associate degree. Figure 5 tells us that it is relatively common for respondents to finish high 
school education (12 years, approximately a quarter respondents) or bachelor degree (16 years, 
around 18 percent of respondents).  Moreover, a great majority of the population completes 
between 11 and 18 years of education.  
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 Figure 6 demonstrates that the most common political view is “moderate,” with almost 
two-fifths of the respondents. It is significantly higher than any other category of this variable. 
The mean and median of respondent’s political views are both approximately 4, which represents 
the moderate view. There are slightly more respondents who identify as conservative-leaning 
(extremely conservative, conservative, or slightly conservative; around 34 percent) than those 
who identify as liberal-leaning (extremely liberal, liberal, or slightly liberal; around 27 percent). 
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
 Table 1 states that the mean, median, and standard deviation for the variable religious 
services are roughly 22, 3, and 29. The difference between the mean and the median, and the 
value of the standard deviation illustrate that respondents of the survey vary a lot among 
themselves in terms of the number of religious services they attend in a year. Figure 7 points out 
that the most common response for the variable religious service is “never” (0 times a year), and 
the second most common response is “every week” (52 times a year). It further confirms that the 
distribution of religious service attendance is bimodal and people either go regularly or rarely. 
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
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 Figure 8 shows that around half of the respondents are women. 
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
Bivariate Findings 
 Table 2 is the correlation matrix among all the dependent, independent, and control 
variables. It demonstrates that the two dependent variables that measure support for immigrants 
(immigrants do not undermine American culture) and immigration policies (increase 
immigration) are positively correlated. Their correlation Pearson index r is .28, which means that 
there is a weak relationship between the dependent variables, and it is statistically significant at p 
< .01 level. It means that the more a person agrees that immigrants do not undermine American 
culture, the more he or she supports increased immigration. Additionally, statistically significant, 
weak, positive correlations (r = .15 and .19) exist between the independent variable “liberalism” 
and both the dependent variables. They indicate that the more liberal an individual identifies, the 
more he or she is to agree that immigrants do not undermine American culture and to say that the 
number of immigrants should be increased. There is also a weak, statistically significant, and 
positive correlation (r = .19) between “education” and “immigrants do not undermine American 
culture.” It means that the more years of education one completes, the more the person is to 
agree that immigrants do not undermine American culture. However, there is no correlation 
between “education” and “increase immigration.” There is a very weak, statistically significant, 
positive correlation between “race” and “increase immigration,” with Pearson r = .092. It implies 
that people of color are more likely to say that the number of immigrants to the United States 
should be increased. However, there is not a correlation between “race” and “immigrants do not 
undermine American culture.” There is no correlation between any of the dependent variables 
and any other independent variables (age and religious services). 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 For the relationship between dependent variables and the control variable “sex,” there is a 
very weak, statistically significant, negative correlation (r = -.09) between “sex” and “increase 
immigration.” It means that women are less likely to say that the number of immigrants to the 
United States should be increased. There is, however, no correlation between “sex” and 
“immigrants do not undermine American culture.” 
 Among independent variables, “race” has a weak but statistically significant correlation 
with all the rest of independent variables, including “age” (r = -.17), “education” (r = -.14), 
“liberalism” (r = .10), and “religious services” (r = .08). It reflects that people of color, on 
average, tend to be younger, have fewer years of education, are more liberal, and attend more 
religious services than White people. Additionally, “age” is weak and negatively correlated “r = -
.099” to “liberalism,” but positively correlated (r = .16) to “religious services.” It means that 
older people, in general, are less liberal and that they attend more religious services in a year 
than younger people. The independent variable “liberalism” and “religious services” are also 
correlated with statistic significance at p < .01 level. Their correlation index r is -.25, which 
means that they have a weak, negative correlation. It says that people who attend more religious 
services tend to be less liberal. There is not any correlation among the rest of independent 
variables. 
 The control variable “sex” is not correlated with any independent variable except for 
“religious services.” Between “sex” and “religious services,” there is a very weak, statistically 
significant, positive correlation, with Pearson r = .14. It means that women, on average, attend 
more religious services yearly than men. 
Multivariate Findings 
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 Table 3 is a ordinary least square regression of attitudes about immigration on all 
variables, including race, age, education, political views, religiosity, and gender. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 The R2 for dependent variable “immigrants do not undermine American culture” is .063. 
It means that 6.3 percent of the variation in “immigrants do not undermine American culture” 
can be explained by the independent variables together. The F value of this regression equation 
is around 11, and it shows statistical significance at the .01 level. Among the predictors, only 
education and political views are statistically significant for “immigrants do not undermine 
American culture.” Controlling for all other variables, education (β = .175) has the greatest effect 
on the dependent variable, meaning on average, the more years of education one completes, the 
more the person agrees that immigrants do not undermine American culture. All else being 
equal, political views (β = .139) have the second greatest effect on “immigrants do not 
undermine American culture.” It indicates that in general, the more liberal a person is, the more 
the person would say that immigrants do not undermine American culture. 
 The R2 for “increase immigration” is .057, demonstrating that independent variables 
combined explains 5.7 percent of the variation in “increase immigration.” The F value of this 
regression equation is around 10, and it is statistically significant at the .01 level. Among the 
predictors, political views and gender are statistically significant for “increase immigration.” 
Controlling for all other factors, political views (β = .182) have the greatest effect on the 
dependent variable, showing that the on average, the more liberal a person is, the more the 
person would say that immigration should be increased in the United States. Controlling for all 
other variables, gender (β = -090) has the second greatest effect on “increase immigration,” and 
this standardized coefficient is the only one with a statistically significant negative value. It 
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means that women more so than men reject the notion that immigration to this country should be 
increased. 
 Comparing across the table and controlling for all other variables, education is a 
statistically significant predictor for “immigrants do not undermine American culture.” However, 
it does not affect whether one supports increased immigration. Gender, on the other hand, is not 
a statistically significant factor for the variation in “immigrants do not undermine American 
culture,” but it is statistically significant for “increase immigration” with all else being equal. 
Political view is significant for both “immigrants do not undermine American culture” and 
“increase immigration.” 
 In relation to the bivariate result, in which race has a statistically significant correlation 
with “increase immigration.” However, the effect is no longer shown in the regression when 
controlling all other variables. It indicates that there is a spurious relationship in the equation for 
“increase immigration.”  
 The multivariate result supports the fourth hypothesis that the more liberal a person is, 
the more likely he or she agrees that immigrants do not undermine American culture and says 
that the number of immigrants nowadays should be increased. The regression equation also 
confirms the first half of the third hypothesis that the more years of education a person receives, 
the more likely the person is to agree that immigrants do not undermine American culture. The 
regression analysis finds no effect between the dependent variables and other predictors 
excluding gender, thus rejecting all other hypotheses in this study. 
DISCUSSION 
 This study seeks to answer what demographic aspects are related to one’s perception of 
immigrants and immigration. Controlling for all other variables, education is the strongest and a 
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statistically significant predictor for the variable “immigrants do not undermine American 
culture.” Education can expose people to diverse groups of people and intercultural dialogue, and 
fewer years of education may imply a lack of adequate socialization for a diverse society. This 
finding implies that contact theory is applicable to explain the effect of education on attitudes 
toward immigrants, since contact theory explains that prejudices and stereotypes come from the 
absence of intergroup contact. Such result is also consistent with past literature on the influence 
of educational attainment on the attitudes toward immigrants (Lancee and Sarrasin 2015). 
Lancee and Sarrasin’s (2015) longitudinal study in Switzerland suggests that education can 
positively change people’s attitudes toward immigrants. Comparatively, this study supports that 
education may in fact have some impact on how people view immigrants in the United States.  
 While education has the strongest effect among all independent variable on “immigrants 
do not undermine American culture,” it does not affect an individual’s support for increased 
immigration. This finding rejects the second part of the third hypothesis that the more years of 
education one completes, the more likely the person is to say that the immigrant number to this 
country should be increased. This result is also inconsistent with Chandler and Tsai’s (2001) 
research. Chandler and Tsai analyzed the 1994 General Social Survey and found that higher 
education level indicates more support for open legal immigration policies. However, from the 
2014 GSS, it is not true that education has such an effect. The inconsistency may come from the 
two decades of time difference of the dataset. During the twenty years between 1994 and 2014, 
the United States saw a surge in undocumented immigrants from predominantly Latin American 
and Asian countries (Hoefer et al. 2012). At the same time, modern international terrorism and 
corresponding xenophobia were also on the rise. Given the complexity and uncertainty of the 
world, Americans might switch to more conservative immigration policies with stricter and 
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lengthier vetting process for non-citizens to enter the country. Consequently, Americans would 
potentially desire a non-increasing flow of immigrants. The change in time might have shrunk 
the effect of education on the acceptance of more open immigration policies, thus possibly 
explaining a non-significant relationship between education and “increase immigration.” 
 On the other hand, the findings in this study suggest that political view has a fairly strong 
effect on both dependent variables. In other words, being liberal positively correlates the 
agreement to the statement that immigrants do not undermine American culture and the support 
for increased immigration. While this research is unable to confirm the outcome of anti-
immigration sentiments from Trump’s presidential campaign in Flores’ (2018) analysis, the 
multivariate result on political views is firmly consistent with many previous studies (Bohman 
and Hjerm 2016; Hawley 2011; Wilkes et al. 2007). Particularly, Bohman and Hjerm’s 
evaluation on the correlation between the support for right-wing parties and anti-immigrant 
attitudes matches the hypothesis that the more liberal a person is, the more he or she is to agree 
that immigrants do not undermine American culture and to say that the number of immigrants 
should be increased. This finding extends the previous research that is primarily conducted in a 
European context to the United States on the effect of political leaning on immigration attitudes. 
 Race, age, and religious services, on the other hand, show no effect on both “immigrants 
do not undermine American culture” and “increase immigration” variables. This result rejects the 
first, second and fifth hypotheses of this study. It also displays inconsistency with Blumer’s 
group threat theory (1958) and many previous literatures (Berg 2014; Bloom et al. 2015; Fussell 
2014; Browne et al. 2018; Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Nagel and Ehrkamp 2017). An explantion 
for the inconsistency is that previous literature focuses on one partcular area of demographic 
identity. With extensive analysis and careful subgroup examination, scholars in the past were 
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able to discover slight differences among subgroups in race, age, and religiosity (Bloom et al. 
2015; Bohman and Hjerm 2014; Browne et al. 2018). With more interest in how the 
demographic factors intersect with each other in forming the attitudes, this research concentrates 
on testing potential predictors rather than a thorough separation of subgroups in each 
demographic identity. As a result, the effects of race, age, and religious services may be 
somewhat weakened by combining subgroups that produce dissimilar effects into the same 
category.  
 The finding that group threat theory may not hold well in this study indicates that 
immigration issue may be different from the original concern of group threat theory- racial 
prejudice, since immigration, unlike domestic matters, encompasses great uncertainty and 
involves global movements. Therefore, it is not surprising that the support and opposition for 
immigration across demographic groups are more unclear and requires much future scrutiny. 
Moreover, group threat theory does not necessarily intend to describe the threat formed based on 
salient social identities such as race and religiosity. The fact that group threat theory fails to 
explain three hypotheses in this study does not mean that it is inapplicable to the issue of 
immigration. Since people whose jobs are threatened by the incoming flow of immigrants may 
logically have more negative feelings toward immigrant than Americans without similar 
concerns, group threat theory can help rationalize in some demographic factors on people’s 
attitudes towards immigration. 
CONCLUSION 
 The purpose of this study is to examine what demographic factors are connected to 
people’s views on immigrants and immigration policies. Assessing data from the 2014 General 
Social Survey, the research includes 1,022 respondents who answered all the relevant questions 
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in this study. The statistical result shows that education has the strongest effect on whether 
people think immigrants undermine American culture, controlling for all variables. Furthermore, 
political views are significant predictor of both “immigrants do not undermine American culture” 
and “increase immigration,” and it is the strongest predictor of “increase immigration.” All other 
independent variables do not affect either dependent variables. The findings support the fourth 
hypothesis in the study that the more liberal a person is, the more likely he or she agrees that 
immigrants do not undermine American culture and says that the number of immigrants 
nowadays should be increased. The result also supports the first half of the third hypothesis that 
the more years of education one completes, the more likely the individual is to agree that 
immigrants do not undermine American culture. All the rest of hypotheses are rejected by the 
statistical findings. The outcome of the statistical analysis suggests that contact theory is 
consistent with the issue of immigration. It also demonstrates that previous research conducted in 
Europe on the relationship between the strength of right-wing political parties and immigration 
attitudes is also applicable to the United States. However, group threat theory and works on the 
correlation between race and immigration attitudes do not hold true to the result of this study, 
possibly due to the fact that this study does not separate subgroup of demographic predictors in 
great detail. Rather, the study concentrates on examining many potential factors on a person’s 
attitudes towards immigration. 
 This study reveals valuable information for a crucial social issue in the United States. 
Previous works on immigration primarily focus on one specific area of the demographics and its 
effect on immigration. This research, on the other hand, provides a broad examination of many 
potential predictors on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies. The result suggests 
that to increase the acceptance of immigrants among American, an adequate education on the 
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matter is foremost. Contact theory also proposes that if a person grows up in a homogeneous 
community and does not have the experience of intergroup contact, future contact can help 
diminish the possible prejudice and stereotyping of immigrants. Moreover, the findings 
demonstrate that it is not true to claim that religious people are less open to immigration and to 
say that older people are less accepting on the subject. Furthermore, there is no relationship 
between race and immigration attitudes, establishing that no racial group, in a larger sense, can 
be said to be more opposed to increased immigration, in contrast to some previous studies. This 
research extends the sociological inquiry into the issue of immigration by identifying various 
predictors of how an individual views immigration and immigrants. It contributes to the subject 
and lays some groundwork for future research on this critical issue. 
Limitations 
 One of the limitations of this study is that the support for immigrants and immigration 
policies has a narrow definition. The variable “immigrants do not undermine American culture” 
can reflect one’s attitudes toward immigrants. However, it is hard to conclude that the person is 
supportive of immigrants based on the answer that the individual agrees or strongly agrees with 
one aspect of immigrants. Moreover, the variable “increase immigration” also does not fully 
reveal the person’s position on immigration policies, since it only measures one component of 
immigration policies. A proper variable to test support for immigration should be a composite 
one that includes one’s positions on multiculturalism, anti-discrimination, and access to jobs and 
housing, in addition to how the number of immigrants should change.  
 Furthermore, this study examines race too broadly. The 2014 General Social Survey 
provides three categories for race: White, Black, and other race. However, only White people 
constitute more than one-fifth of the sample. By creating the people of color category, there is a 
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loss of variation that may explain the lack of effect of race on immigration attitudes, which is 
inconsistent with past literature with detailed subgroups of ethnicities.  
 Last but not least, the R2 in this study is only .063 and .057 for the two dependent 
variables, respectively. It means that only approximately six percent of the variation in 
“immigrants do not undermine American culture” and “increase immigration” can be explained 
by all the independent variables combined. The small value of R2 signals that some key factors 
influencing people’s stances towards immigration are yet to be identified. For instance, 
geography may play a role in the dependent variables. Since people who reside on the coasts 
tend to be more likely to have multi-cultural and intergroup relations, contact theory predicts that 
one’s residence location could be a predictor for immigration attitudes. Although both regression 
equations are statistically significant, there is such limitation that more possible factors should be 
examined in this study. 
Future Research 
 Previous research concentrates primarily on the correlation between one demographic 
background and immigration attitudes. This study extends previous literature by examining 
multiple demographic aspects of a person in relation to his or her stances on immigrants and 
immigration policies. It lays foundational work for future research that digs deeper into potential 
predictors relevant to immigration. For instance, future research can test the relevance of group 
threat theory on non-salient identity classifications. Race itself may not affect immigration 
support. However, individuals whose jobs in the agricultural, industrial, and service sector are 
taken by immigrants can have a strong opposition to inclusive immigration policies. Studying 
non-salient identities can help determine crucial predictors on this issue. 
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 Additionally, Future research can take a more qualitative approach to study individuals’ 
attitudes towards immigration. In-depth interview, for example, is a great way to understand 
people’s reasoning behind a specific viewpoint. Conducting qualitative studies can, therefore, 
guide the researcher to identify themes and rationales in the topic of immigration that affects the 
future of the United States and beyond. 
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Figure 1. Bar graph of respondent’s agreement with whether immigrants undermine American 
culture 
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Figure 2. Bar graph of respondent’s position on whether the number of immigrants nowadays 
should be reduced or increased 
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Figure 3. Bar graph of race of the respondents  
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Figure 4. Bar graph of age of the respondents  
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Figure 5. Bar graph of years of education of respondents have completed  
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Figure 6. Bar graph of political views of the respondents  
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Figure 7. Bar graph of how often respondents attend religious service  
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Figure 8. Bar graph of sex of the respondents 
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   Table 1. Means, medians, and standard deviations for variables (N = 1022) 
Variables Mean Median       SD 
Immigrants undermine American culture 3.47 4.00 0.974 
Increase immigration 2.55 3.00 1.018 
People of color 0.24 0.00 0.425 
Age 49.17 50.00 17.288 
Education 13.94 14.00 2.983 
Liberalism 3.87 4.00 1.430 
Religious services 22.18 3.00 29.136 
Women 0.52 1.00 0.500 
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Table 2. Correlations (r) between immigrations attitudes and six variables (listwise deletion, two-tailed test, N 
= 1022) 
 
Increase 
immigration 
People 
of color Age Education Liberalism 
Religious 
services Women 
Immigrants do 
not undermine 
American 
culture 
 .275* -.061  .018  .192*  .152* -.072 -.065 
Increase 
immigration 
 
 .092* -.079  .068  .193* -.026 -.086* 
People of color 
  
-.167* -.143*  .104*  .082*  .044 
Age 
   
-.024 -.099*  .164*  .005 
Education 
    
 .078 -.049  .001 
Liberalism 
     
-.253* -.025 
Religious 
services 
      
 .136* 
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Table 3. Multiple regression of attitudes about immigration on all variables (N = 1022) 
Variable Immigrants do not undermine American 
culture 
β 
Increase immigration 
β 
People of color  -.041   .074 
Age   .033  -.053 
Education     .175*   .065 
Liberalism     .139*     .182* 
Religious services  -.022   .038 
Women  -.057    -.090* 
R2   .063   .057 
F(6,1015) 11.411* 10.301* 
*p < .01 
 
